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This paper considers whether a tax on currency transactions could
be expected to raise a significant sum of money for use in the war on
poverty. It traces the detailed discussion of Kenen and the subsequent
argument of Schmidt, that technical developments would now permit the
tax to be levied efficiently by the five authorities who issue currencies in
which transactions are settled. It notes the creation of the CLS Bank and
the proposal to confine a currency transactions tax to transactions that
go through that bank, but argues that this would have dangers. It notes
also Spahn’s proposal for a geographically limited tax, but argues that
this would not be advantageous if the aim is to raise revenue. The final
verdict is that a currency transactions tax of 1 basis point would be
feasible and could be expected to raise a sum of the order of US$ 20
billion per year.
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I
Introduction
The idea of levying a “modest” tax on currency
transactions goes back to a lecture that James Tobin,
the Nobel Laureate in Economics, delivered in 1972.1
He envisaged a tax rate of perhaps 1% of the value of a
foreign exchange transaction, which, he argued, might
accomplish two purposes simultaneously. One would
be to throw some sand in the wheels of international
finance, which he envisaged as restoring a degree of
independence to national monetary policies and
curbing destructive destabilizing speculation. The
second, a by-product, would be to raise money for some
international good cause.
Subsequent debate has disputed these claims. The
prospect of being able to stabilize the currency markets
by taxing currency transactions is disputed by many,
on the ground that instability is caused by the overhang
of the stock of short-term assets rather than large flows
of payments through the markets. Furthermore, many
have claimed that a Tobin tax would be subject to
such widespread evasion, through either the
substitution of other transactions for those subject to
the tax or the relocation of markets to untaxed
jurisdictions, as to thwart the objective of giving a
significant degree of independence to national
monetary policies. Similarly, many dispute the idea
that a tax rate of anything like 1% (100 basis points)2
could be levied without resulting in extensive evasion,
arguing that it would probably lead to the existing
dealer market being replaced by a broker market, which
would shrink the volume of transactions enormously.
One cannot estimate the yield of a currency
transactions tax by taking 1% of the current value of
such transactions (estimated at nearly US$ 1.9 trillion
per day in the latest survey by the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS)) and conclude that it would be
possible to raise trillions of dollars a year to finance
some international good cause.
It may be infeasible to materially reduce the
likelihood of currency crises by imposing a Tobin tax
(though that is still subject to some dispute), but a
relatively high tax rate (such as 25 basis points) might
significantly widen international differences in
monetary policies (Felix and Sau, 1996). Most relevant
to the purpose of this group, and therefore to this note,
even a very low tax rate could raise significant sums of
money.
This note was prepared for the Technical Group on
Innovative Financing Mechanisms, and is published here with
the consent of the Institute for International Economics
(Copyright © Institute for International Economics. All rights
reserved). The author is grateful to Ricardo Ffrench-Davis for
his comments on an earlier draft.
1 See Tobin 1974, amplified in Tobin 1978.
II
Establishing a Tax Base
A key condition that would have to be satisfied for a
currency transactions tax to raise a substantial sum of
money is the avoidance of significant evasion. A
prerequisite for this is the establishment of an
unambiguous and comprehensive tax base.
Currency transactions take a variety of forms. The
plain vanilla operation is a spot transaction, where a
holder exchanges (say) dollars for euros, for delivery
today or tomorrow. The traditional alternative was a
forward transaction, where a holder agreed a price at
which he or she would buy (say) euros for dollars at
some determinate date three days or more in the future.
An exporter who knows he or she will be paid a foreign
currency at some well-specified date in the future can
hedge his or her receipts by selling the foreign currency
2 One basis point is equivalent to one hundredth of a percentage
point.
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forward on the date he or she will receive it, and buying
his or her home currency with the proceeds. Covered
interest arbitrage takes place by an agent selling dollars
(say) for euros spot, investing for some defined period
in euro-denominated assets, and then selling euros
forward at the termination of the investment period, so
that the operation has no currency risk. The more recent
alternative is a swap transaction, where a holder of
dollars (say) takes temporary possession of euros but
with an agreement to reacquire the dollars at an agreed
price at some specified date in the future and in the
meantime allows the counterparty to make use of the
dollar assets. The other major form of activity involves
options, where a holder of dollars purchases a right to
acquire euros (say) at a specified price, but exercises
that right only if the market moves to a rate that yields
a profit (“puts the contract in the money”) within the
period that the option holds. Yet another alternative is
a futures contract, which is similar to a forward in that
it promises delivery of a specified currency in return
for another at a determinate exchange rate on a
specified future date, but differs in that the contract
can subsequently be traded on a public exchange.
Futures are often settled merely by exchanging the net
difference in value between the two currencies, and
thus tend to appeal to those engaged in speculation
rather than hedging of commercial transactions, but
they would nevertheless be capable of providing a good
substitute for a forward contract.
Tobin’s initial suggestion was that a currency
transactions tax (CTT) should apply just to spot
transactions. He argued that this would catch most
forward transactions too, because a bank that makes a
forward sale of a currency typically covers itself by
buying that currency spot. Even if this is normally true,
however, it would probably not remain true for very
long after the institution of a CTT. An untaxed three-
day forward sale would be too good a substitute for a
taxed two-day spot sale to prevent massive substitution
of the former for the latter.3  Accordingly, subsequent
writers have suggested broadening the tax base in order
to catch all transactions that might provide good
substitutes for spot transactions.
For a long time the most thorough and influential
paper dealing with these issues was that by Peter Kenen
(1996). Kenen proposed to levy the tax on forward
transactions as well as on spot transactions, on the
grounds presented above that these are very close
substitutes and so imposition of the tax on just spot
transactions would invite substitution of forwards. He
suggested that one should tax futures as well, both
when the contract was first struck and every time it was
subsequently traded, since as also argued above these
could easily emerge as good substitutes for forward
transactions. Second, he proposed that the CTT be
extended also to swaps. This is because a swap provides
a close substitute for the simultaneous spot and forward
transactions that have customarily been involved in
covered interest arbitrage, and they would therefore
provide an efficient method for extensive tax avoidance
if they remained untaxed. Third, he suggested that each
party involved in a wholesale transaction (defined as
one with another registered dealer, who would have to
be just a dealer and not also acting as agent of a
financial institution) should pay the tax at half the
standard rate that would apply to retail transactions.
Fourth, he proposed to base the tax on where deals are
struck rather than where they are booked or settled, on
the ground that dealing rooms are far more immobile
than the computers used to book deals and that
settlements are customarily made on net debts rather
than the gross transactions that one would want to tax.
Finally, and more relevant to the discussion in the next
section, he proposed that transactions with non-
cooperating jurisdictions that did not levy the tax
should be charged a penal rate, so as to discourage
migration of dealing rooms to untaxed jurisdictions.
Kenen’s most complex discussion concerns the
advisability of taxing options. He acknowledged the
danger that options left untaxed might start to crowd
out forwards and futures, but was nevertheless reluctant
to suggest taxing them. One reason is that an option
may never be exercised, and another is that even if it is
exercised the beneficiary will still have to buy foreign
exchange spot (and will therefore pay the tax) if his
purpose is hedging rather than speculation. He also
argued that there was a danger of a tax on a “plain
vanilla” options contract inspiring the “rocket
scientists” to design synthetic currency contracts and
more complex contracts, which would expose those
who were induced to switch from forwards and futures
to additional risks in dealing with complex derivative
instruments.
Several other issues also concerned Kenen. First,
he worried that his proposed structure involved
assessing taxes solely on registered foreign exchange
3 Spot transactions are defined as those in which settlement is
due within two days, and forward transactions as those in which
settlement is due in three days or more. Even a modest tax rate
would provide a strong incentive to postpone settlement by a
day in normal times if that allowed avoidance of the tax.
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dealers, which would leave retail transactions between
non-banks untaxed. While these may be small at the
moment, there is a danger that they would rapidly grow
if they were left untaxed and a substantial tax rate were
imposed on transactions between dealers. Second, he
suggested that “small” transactions (which he
suggested might be defined as those of less than a
million dollars each) be exempted. Third, he noted (but
did not endorse) that many authors had taken for
granted that official transactions, specifically those by
currency boards, should be exempted. Finally, he noted
that his structure would impose double taxation on
those shifting between minor currencies, since a trade
of (say) the Brazilian real for the Mexican peso is
normally done by going through a vehicle currency
(in practice the United States dollar) rather than
directly.
Garber (1996) is one of the most influential
sceptics of the feasibility of enforcing a CTT. This is
partly because of the difficulties discussed in the next
section of establishing universal participation among
governments, but he also argued that the market would
be capable of devising ways of avoiding the tax. One
channel he identifies is retail transactions between non-
banks: limiting these would in his view require
bringing non-banks with active treasury departments
into the tax net. Another avoidance technique would
be possible if a foreign exchange transaction were
defined as the exchange of one bank deposit for another
in a different currency, since it would be possible to
substitute swaps of treasury bills in countries with
liquid treasury bill markets. Or else the two parties
could provide credit to each other in the two currencies,
collateralized by the claim that each has on the other.
Yet other methods could be employed if supervisors
and tax authorities saw through these subterfuges and
began to tax them. Avoidance would end only when
the liquidity premium on the less liquid assets that
would be used was equal to the transactions tax.
Kenen’s recommendation of levying a CTT on the
basis of where a deal is struck has been challenged by
Schmidt (1999), whose argument has been endorsed
by Clunies-Ross (2003). Schmidt argues that in view
of technical developments since Kenen’s paper it would
now be feasible for the monetary authorities that issue
the world’s five vehicle currencies4  to identify and
therefore to tax the gross value of all transactions into
and out of their currencies. This would involve the tax
being collected by the authorities in which transactions
are settled rather than agreed. Kenen dismissed this
possibility on the ground that many transactions are
netted before they are settled, but Schmidt argued that
the monetary authorities of the vehicle-currency
countries have the leverage needed to oblige offshore
netting systems, as well as their own foreign exchange
banks, to report gross transactions to them. This is
possible because of arrangements that have already
been adopted in order to protect transactors against
settlement risk. In fact monetary authorities already
levy charges on bank settlements of currency
transactions in order to pay for use of the information
software used in settlement, and since all transactions
go through one of the five vehicle currencies at least
once it would need only those five authorities to collect
the CTT.
An agreement that involved only those five
authorities would be subject to the danger of avoidance
as banks shifted their operations to other currencies.
To safeguard against this, Schmidt suggests that
another eight or so countries with currencies that might
come to be used as vehicle currencies would need to
be prepared to cooperate in applying the tax if
migration of the market were to occur. It would be
desirable to obtain their ex ante agreement, so as to
discourage market migration induced by the hope of
tax avoidance.
It has been claimed that the feasibility of levying
the tax at the settlement stage has been further enhanced
by the opening in September 2002 of the CLS Bank.5
“CLS” stands for “continuous linked system” and is a
private sector response to the Group of Ten’s concern
with settlement risk. Under the traditional foreign
exchange system, all foreign exchange trades due to
be settled in a particular centre on a particular day
were settled simultaneously at the end of that centre’s
working day. Since many foreign exchange trades
involved more than one time zone, this exposed traders
to the risk that they would not receive their payment
4 The United States dollar, euro, yen, pound sterling, and Swiss
franc.
5 The parent company is Swiss while the operational bank is in
London. Both are regulated by the Federal Reserve.  The
holding company has 71 shareholders, and they and another
257 third parties settle their transactions in the 15 currencies
currently covered by the system through the central banks of
the countries involved (the issuers of the 5 vehicle currencies
plus Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong SAR, New Zealand,
Norway, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa and
Sweden).
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because their counterparty would become insolvent in
the interim (like Herstatt Bank in September 1974).
The CLS Bank enables those who use it to avoid this
risk, because the payment in one currency (the one
that has been sold) occurs simultaneously with receipt
of the other (the one that has been bought): the CLS
Bank operates 24 hours a day on the basis of continuous
clearing. The CLS is now estimated to have a turnover
of about US$ 1 trillion a day, which is reported to be
about 45% of current market volume.
One possibility would be to confine a currency
transactions tax (CTT) to those transactions that go
through the CLS. This would mean sacrificing over half
of the yield of the tax, at least on present parameters.
There is also an issue as to how many transactions
would be diverted from the CLS if it alone were to be
subjected to a tax. Obviously this would depend on
the rate of tax, but even with a very low rate that
possibility should be borne in mind. Presumably a
member bank or registered third party is not obliged to
channel all its transactions through the CLS Bank, in
which case one might expect that many participants
would react to a CTT by settling their routine
transactions (those with highly creditworthy partners




It has long been argued that it would be essential
to operation of a CTT to have the participation of all
countries with active foreign exchange markets.
The reason is that non-participation by even one
centre would give it an enormous competitive
advantage, so that the market would rapidly migrate
to that centre and undermine the tax regime. Not
only is this true of established financial centres,
including the ones l ike Hong Kong SAR and
Singapore in economies that have not traditionally
been classified as industrial countries, but it is
argued that the market would migrate to putative
financial centres like Grand Cayman or the Bahamas
if they did not levy the tax. Even gaining the
adhesion of the traditional financial centres like
London and New York would be problematic, given
that the United Kingdom and the United States have
for many years taken a very laissez-faire line on
their offshore financial sectors, in part motivated
by the rich financial pickings from hosting such a
sector. The usual conclusion has been that general
participation is doubly necessary: both in order to
prevent the market migrating and the tax being
undermined by that migration, and to reassure the
market leaders that their position would not be
undercut by any such migration occurring.
The paper of Kenen (1996) already discussed in
the previous section made an important proposal that
might make this challenge somewhat less demanding.
If the agreement establishing a CTT were to include his
suggestion of a penal rate6  on transactions with
jurisdictions that did not levy the CTT, this would
probably make it necessary only to reach agreement
among the countries that already have established
financial centres, and not to get every potential tax
haven like Grand Cayman and the Isle of Man on board
too. But that leaves a demanding task: One is talking
not only about the United States and the United
Kingdom, about Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, but
also about countries like Chile, South Africa and New
Zealand where the foreign exchange market currently
serves only local needs but could easily be expanded
to deal also with dollar/euro and dollar/yen trade. On
the other hand, levying the tax by the place of
settlement as urged by Schmidt would be far less
demanding.
An important paper by Spahn (2002) has challenged
the conventional view that the tax makes sense only if
imposed universally. Spahn argues that it would be
feasible for the European Union to tax transactions
involving the euro (and the pound sterling?) at a modest
rate even if other issuers of vehicle currencies (except
perhaps for Switzerland) declined to cooperate. His
argument about the need for Swiss cooperation seems to
rest on the tax being levied on deals agreed by trading
desks (as suggested by Kenen), since it is based on the
strong advantages to the trading centres being in the same
6 He suggested a rate a hundred times higher, of 5% rather than
0.05%.
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time zones as those where trades are generated. However,
this option would generate cumbersome reporting
requirements, which are largely unnecessary if one resorts
to the alternative espoused by Schmidt, of relating the
tax to settlement. Under the option of automated,
centralized tax collection at the stage of settlement, tax
liability arises from the access of market participants to
national gross settlement systems. Operations prior to
settlement (such as the taxation of forward transactions
espoused earlier) can be included by contractual
requirements on those participating. Spahn argues that
there would still be a need for reporting by institutions
(including big multinational companies that settle many
trades internally) that do not participate in official and
centralized clearing and settlement. These institutions
could either join the official system or convey relevant
information to it.
If one is looking to maximize the revenue yielded
by a CTT, then a geographically limited tax such as that
espoused by Spahn makes little sense. Only if the issuer
of one or more of the vehicle currencies were adamantly
opposed to even a very modest rate of CTT while the
others were favourable would it make any sense to
contemplate this. But one should not have any illusions
that there would be potentially important effects from
even a low tax rate. For example, the euro’s role as a
vehicle currency between (say) Poland and the Czech
Republic would surely fall victim to a CTT that was




How much money could a CTT raise? That depends upon
the design of the tax and the rate at which it is imposed.
There are of course many possibilities, but it is notable
that over time the tax rates that have been discussed
have fallen dramatically. Tobin initially spoke of a
1% rate, but in 1995 he wrote that a 0.1% tax rate
might be more prudent to avoid swamping the normal
commission (Tobin 1996). At the same conference
Jeffrey Frankel also spoke of a 0.1% rate, and Peter
Kenen of 0.05%, while only Stephany Griffith-Jones
(0.5%) and David Felix and Ranjau Sau (0.25%)
suggested tax rates higher than Tobin’s figure. Since
then Nissanke (2005) has estimated the revenue that
would be raised by tax rates of 0.01% and 0.02%
(respectively 1 and 2 basis points), while Spahn (2002)
suggested tax rates of 0.01 and 0.005% (respectively
one basis point and half a basis point).
The most optimistic revenue estimates assume high
tax rates and minimal impact of the tax in reducing the
volume of transactions. As an extreme case, consider
the yield of a 1% (100 basis points) tax rate on foreign
exchange turnover of US$ 1.88 trillion per day (the
BIS estimate of turnover in April 2004, after netting
out for double counting), assuming that there were no
evasion and no decline in foreign exchange market
activity induced by the tax. Such a CTT would raise
nearly US$ 19 billion a day, or US$ 4.5 trillion per
year, assuming 240 working days in a year. However,
in view of the previous discussion of the difficulties of
establishing an erosion-resistant tax base and the fact
that a tax rate this high would yield many thousands
per cent of the traders’ value added, it is fanciful to
imagine that a CTT could yield anything of this order of
magnitude.
Hypothesize instead a tax imposed at an equal
rate on all spot foreign exchange transactions, as Tobin
initially did, but at a rate typical of other indirect taxes.
VAT, for example, is typically something in the vicinity
of 15%. The value added in a foreign exchange
transaction–the margin between buying and selling
rates– is reported by Spahn to be only around one basis
point for large inter-dealer wholesale transactions (what
is often referred to as “hot potato trading”), which still
constitute the majority of transactions.7  That would
suggest that the tax rate might be around 0.15 basis
points in order to impose a burden comparable to other
indirect taxes. That may not sound much, and certainly
not compared to Tobin’s initial suggestion of 100 basis
points, but 0.0015% of US$ 621 billion (the latest BIS
estimate of the daily value of spot transactions) is over
7 The latest BIS survey estimated that about 53% of foreign
exchange transactions were purely between dealers. This marks
a considerable decline from the 59% reported in 2001 and the
70% reported in 1992.
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US$ 9 million. Given 240 working days in a year, a CTT
at this rate would yield around US$ 2.2 billion per
year if there were no evasion and no decline in foreign
exchange market activity induced by the tax. Unless
that decline were more than 10%, a currency
transactions tax could be expected to raise over US$ 2
billion a year in the absence of evasion. That is modest
compared to the estimates that have usually been
presented, but perhaps still enough to make the tax
worth consideration. The cost of administration of the
tax, which no one seems to have estimated, would need
to be deducted, but this would presumably be rather
small as the tax could be levied automatically by
suitable programming of the computers used in the
forex market, especially if the tax were assessed on
settlement rather than deals.
There is a big gap separating US$ 4.5 trillion and
US$ 2 billion. Is it possible to envisage a CTT that could
realistically be expected to yield more than the latter
sum?
How about levying the tax on the base and at the
rates proposed by Kenen (1996)? This would tax
forward and swap transactions as well as spot
transactions, at a standard tax rate of 5 basis points and
with a tax on inter-dealer transactions that would be
2½ basis points each. Given the BIS estimate of
US$ 1,880 billion turnover per day, this tax would yield
US$ 940 million per working day or US$ 226 billion
per year, in the absence of evasion and any tax-induced
decline in foreign exchange market activity. If each
final transaction involves one inter-dealer transaction
as well, the cost of a final transaction would increase
by 10 basis points, or maybe by 100%. (Margins with
final consumers are of course far bigger than the inter-
dealer margins referred to before.) If the demand for
final foreign exchange transactions has unitary
elasticity, the doubling of cost would imply a halving
in the volume of foreign exchange transactions and
therefore in tax revenue, to US$ 113 billion per year,
which is still a substantial sum.
With a rate as high as this, however, one has to
worry about the qualifications concerning evasion and
an induced decline in market activity. On inter-dealer
transactions the tax rate would be about 250% of value
added, which is the sort of tax rate that customarily
induces strong efforts at avoidance. If the doomsday
scenario –in which the tax induces collapse of the
existing dealer structure of the market in favour of a
structure in which foreign exchange brokers put
customers directly in contact with one another– were
to materialize, the tax base would shrink by at least
53% (the latest estimate of the proportion of
transactions that are hot-potato inter-dealer
transactions). Admittedly in that event the cost of a
final transaction might rise by something short of 10
basis points, so the potential tax yield might be over
US$ 53 billion per year (which is 47% of US$ 113
billion), perhaps in the range of US$ 60 billion to
US$ 100 billion per year.
If one worries that Kenen’s proposed rates are too
high, a possible compromise would be to adopt his
suggestions regarding the tax base but to adopt a tax
rate of one basis point (and thus half a basis point each
for inter-dealer transactions), as several other writers
have discussed. This would yield 0.01% of US$ 1.88
trillion for 240 days a year, or some US$ 45 billion per
year in the absence of evasion and any decline in
foreign exchange market activity induced by the tax.8
Of course, one should expect that the tax would induce
some decline in market activity. Again assuming that
each transaction with a final consumer induced one
inter-dealer transaction as well, whose cost is passed
on, and unit elasticity of the demand curve for foreign
exchange transactions by final consumers, the
estimated yield of a currency transactions tax would
be some US$ 23 billion per year, without allowing for
collection costs.
Lastly, consider finally the potential yield of a tax
confined to transactions through CLS, which are stated
to total about US$ 1 trillion per day, so a 1 basis point
tax rate would yield some US$ 100 million per day or
US$ 24 billion per year, without evasion or any impact
on trading volume; the latter would probably result in
a tax yield of well under US$ 20 billion a year.
These figures may be compared to those that have
been advanced by other recent writers, as shown in the
box.
8 Is this figure compatible with the US$ 2 billion per year
previously cited for a 0.15 basis point tax on spot transactions?
Yes. Spot transactions are less than a third of the transactions
that Kenen proposes to tax, and 0.15 basis points (the tax rate)
is little more than one-seventh of the tax rate postulated here.
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Some writers have tried to argue that the incidence
of such a tax would probably be progressive, either
because it would squeeze the financial sector or because
the main users of the currency markets tend to be the
wealthy. In my view the operative word here is
“probably”. We really do not have the evidence to
conclude a strong presumption about the distributive
impact of a CTT, but I would concur in the presumption
that it is likely to be progressive.
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